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Sleeper85 5c171aea14 Docs: Explain the 0 A limit in the combiner
Document why the combiner accepts 0 A as a valid charge and discharge limit.
2026-11-08 23:08:34 +01:00

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Design decisions

Some parts of the codebase look more verbose or more redundant than they need to be. They are deliberate. This page records why, so that a well-intentioned cleanup doesn't reintroduce a bug that took a long time to find.

Do not refactor anything listed here without discussing it first, and read the rationale before touching the code.

Cut-Off / EOC logic

File: packages/yambms/yambms_core.yaml

The End Of Charge condition is deliberately compound. It has to distinguish a genuine EOC from a charge current that is merely capped by low solar production. Collapsing it into a single threshold or voltage comparison reintroduces false EOC on overcast days.

The combiner pipeline

Files: packages/bms/bms_combine.yaml, packages/shunt/shunt_combine.yaml, packages/yambms/yambms_core.yaml

Every BMS and Shunt package instance runs the same interval lambda, and they coordinate through a shared counter rather than through any central loop. Each instance only acts on the tick where var_to_combine_bms_number equals its own ${bms_id}, then increments the counter so the next instance can run. yambms_core.yaml (STEP 2) waits until every device has been processed, then resets the counters to 1 for the next round.

This is why bms_id must start at 1 and be contiguous. It is not a style rule and not only about the bitmask index: with a gap in the numbering, the counter stops at the missing id, never advances, and STEP 2 never fires. The whole pipeline deadlocks silently.

Include the BMS and Shunt packages in ascending id order. Out-of-order includes still converge, but spread one round over several intervals instead of completing in one.

can_be_combined is deliberately exhaustive

The condition in bms_combine.yaml checks every sensor the combiner will read. It is long on purpose: a single missing or NaN value entering the totals corrupts the aggregate that drives the inverter. Do not shorten it to a few representative checks.

Note that the checks are not uniform. Most use has_state(), but total_voltage and battery_capacity use > 0 — a BMS reporting zero for those is treated as not ready rather than as a valid reading. max_charge_current and max_discharge_current use >= 0: 0 A is a valid limit that a BMS can announce, and it must not take that BMS out of the combination. A NaN still fails the comparison, so a limit that was never received keeps the BMS uncombined.

Combined by contribution, combined continuously, uncombined

Three distinct scopes in the same lambda, and they are not interchangeable:

  • By contribution — total_installed_battery_capacity is a maintained total, not a per-round accumulator. Each BMS remembers the last capacity it contributed in bms${bms_id}_installed_capacity and applies only the difference to the total. So the installed capacity follows a capacity change made at runtime, without a reboot, while an offline BMS simply stops updating its contribution — which stays in the total. It represents the installed capacity and deliberately does not shrink when a BMS drops offline.
  • Not continuously — the combined counter is incremented on the transition into the combined state, not on every tick.
  • Continuously — the totals, bitmasks and min/max values are recomputed every round.

total_installed_battery_capacity must never be turned into a per-round accumulator reset in the Global vars reset block like the other totals. Its sensor is polled independently of STEP 2 and its state is written straight into CAN frame 0x379 with no has_state() guard, so a transient zero would announce 0 Ah of installed capacity to the inverter.

bms_seen_online_bitmask is never cleared

It records that a BMS has been online at least once since boot. shunt_combine.yaml uses it to tell "this BMS is offline" apart from "this BMS was never there" — a shunt must not be uncombined because of a BMS the user never installed.

Cell numbers are offset per pack

The combiner reports cell number + (${bms_id} × 100), so cell 8 of BMS 1 is reported as 108 and cell 3 of BMS 2 as 203. This makes the pack immediately identifiable in the dashboard. It caps a pack at 99 cells, which is well beyond any realistic configuration.

A shunt uncombine turns the user switch off, and does not turn it back on

When a BMS mapped to a shunt goes offline, shunt_combine.yaml switches Combine enabled off and records which BMS caused it, so the diagnostic State entity can say so. Re-enabling is deliberately manual: coming back online does not automatically restore the combination, because the SoC reference has to be trusted before it is used again.

The {0} sentinel in bms_ids

shunt${shunt_id}_bms_map defaults to '{0}' because the vector needs a non-empty initialiser, and the loop skips id 0 (if (!bms_id) continue;). Do not "clean up" the zero — it is what makes an unmapped shunt valid.

CAN frame catalogue

File: packages/yambms/yambms_canbus.yaml

Several can_id values are reused with different payloads depending on the protocol:

CAN ID Frame Protocol
0x359 5 PYLON
0x359 24 Deye PCS
0x371 11 SEPLOS
0x371 28 Deye PCS

A frame's identity is its internal frame number, never its CAN ID. Do not merge two blocks because they share a CAN ID — that would break both protocols at once.

Byte order is not uniform either: 0x373 sends min cell voltage before max, 0x361 sends max before min. Both match their respective specifications. Do not "harmonise" them.

Frame sequencing

File: packages/yambms/yambms_canbus.yaml

Each protocol is defined as a sequence of frame numbers emitted on a fixed interval, so a full cycle lasts interval × sequence length — from a few hundred milliseconds to over a second depending on the protocol. Some inverters are sensitive to that cadence. Do not change the interval to make protocols "consistent" with each other.

When adding a frame to a sequence, remember that the sequence length is tracked alongside the array. Keep the two in sync, or the new frame will silently never be emitted.

The update and telemetry services must never block the loop task

File: packages/yambms/yambms_service.yaml

http_request runs synchronously on the ESP32 loop task. ESPHome arms the IDF task watchdog at 5s with CONFIG_ESP_TASK_WDT_PANIC=y, and feeds it at most every 1 s, so any single blocking call has a 4s budget before the device panics and reboots.

Two paths exceed that budget on a network that filters outbound traffic. Both were reproduced on an OPNsense firewall and measured on hardware:

Path Blocking time Bounded by
Port 80 dropped silently 4.5s timeout, whose ESPHome default is 4.5s
Port 53 filtered (drop or reject) 7.0 s, fixed nothing — timeout does not cover DNS

The 7s figure is the lwIP resolver retry ladder (1 + 1 + 2 + 3s over DNS_MAX_RETRIES), and it is deterministic to a few milliseconds. A reject is not faster than a drop: lwIP's UDP API has no error callback, so the ICMP unreachable is counted and discarded, and the query still runs its full budget. Only an actual DNS answer — including NXDOMAIN from a local resolver — fails fast.

This is why three separate settings are needed, and none of them is redundant:

  • watchdog_timeout: 60s is the only thing that covers the DNS wait. It is never reached in normal operation, where a full request takes under 400 ms.
  • timeout: 3s brings the socket phase back under the 4s budget. It does not help the DNS case.
  • The failure counter (yambms${yambms_id}_var_service_failures) is what stops the loop from freezing for 7s every 6h, forever, on a device that will never reach the internet.

my_network.is_connected() is not a reachability test — it only proves the device holds an IP. It is kept as a cheap first filter, but the counter is the real guard. Do not remove it on the grounds that the connectivity check above it "already handles this".

The counter is incremented from on_error, which fires only when no connection could be made. An HTTP error status still fires on_response and resets the counter, which is correct: the network worked, so there is no freeze to protect against.

The POST is guarded by an if on the counter rather than nested inside the GET's on_response. Nesting would stack one blocking request inside another on a loop task whose stack is 8192 B by default — see LOOP_TASK_STACK.md. It also avoids a second 7s freeze on a filtered network, halving the worst case.

Reaching 3 failures disables both requests until reboot.

Two services, one counter

The two requests are gated independently, by substitution and therefore at compile time:

Substitution Request What it does
yambms_update_service GET checks the latest published version
yambms_telemetry_service POST sends the node's configuration

They share one counter, and that is deliberate: the counter measures whether the network is reachable, not whether a given endpoint answered. Both requests block the loop task the same way, so either one is a valid source of that signal.

This is why the POST carries its own on_error / on_response, which looks redundant next to the GET's. It is not. With yambms_update_service: 'false' there is no GET, and without those triggers nothing would ever increment the counter — the POST would freeze the loop for 7s every 6h forever, which is exactly the bug the counter exists to prevent.

The one thing the two services share besides the counter is yambms${yambms_id}_var_service_round_failed: cleared at the start of every round, raised by any request that could not connect. The POST is skipped when it is set, so a round that has already frozen the loop once does not freeze it a second time for nothing.

Keep that flag separate from the counter. The counter is cumulative and spans rounds; the question the POST needs answered is "did a request fail in this round", which is not the same question. Expressing it as failures == 0 happens to work while the GET runs immediately before the POST and always writes the counter, but it silently breaks with yambms_update_service: 'false': nothing resets the counter before the guard, so the POST would stop for good after its first failed round, and the counter would sit at 1 without ever reaching the threshold that disables the service.

The interval carries a startup_delay

An interval: does not wait a full period before its first run. The scheduler sets the first execution at now + random(0, min(period / 2, 5s)), capped by MAX_INTERVAL_DELAY = 5000 — see the first execution happens immediately after a random smallish offset comment in core/scheduler.cpp. A 6h interval therefore fires within 5 seconds of setup().

Without startup_delay, that first request lands in the middle of boot: combiner init at priority 600, the first CAN frames to the inverter, RS485 polling starting up. Whether it runs at all comes down to a race with the WiFi association, since is_connected() is usually still false that early. That race is also why the reported symptom was a reboot every 6h rather than a boot loop — but it is a race, not a design, and a fast reconnect after OTA can win it.

startup_delay: 5min puts the request outside the boot window and makes the sequence deterministic on a network that filters outbound traffic:

t What happens failures
5min GET fails after 7s, POST skipped 1
6h05 same 2
12h05 same 3
18h05 and later condition is false, no request is made 3

So a device that will never reach the internet freezes for 7s three times over 12 hours, then never again. The counter is restore_value: no, so a reboot replays that sequence — acceptable for a node meant to run for months, and the reason the threshold is not lower: a single transient outage must not disable version checking for good.

A version check has no urgency, so the 5min delay costs nothing.

A derived sensor is published by its source, not polled

File: packages/base/device_base.yaml

esp32_uptime formats the value of esp32_uptime_sec for humans. It used to do so from its own update_interval: 10s lambda, reading id(esp32_uptime_sec).state.

Two independent pollers reading one another is a race. Each starts with its own random offset in [0, 5s) — see the startup_delay note above — so on roughly half of boots the text sensor ran first and formatted a state that had never been published. That state is NaN, and the float→int conversion saturates to INT32_MAX on Xtensa, which the formatter prints as 24855d 3h 14m 7s. It reached the dashboard, the LVGL label, and the telemetry POST, where it was stored server-side as a real record.

The source's on_value now publishes the text sensor, and the lambda formats x — the value that was just published. The failure mode is not guarded against, it cannot occur.

Do not convert it back to a polled lambda with a has_state() guard. The guard would work, but it leaves two pollers where one is enough, and it puts the ordering question back in front of whoever edits the file next.

esp32_date_time_now keeps its own poller, because it has no source sensor to hang a trigger on. There the guard is now().is_valid(), and it is the right tool: the problem is an NTP sync that may not have happened yet, not a scheduling order.

The inverter protocol is resolved once, never in the loop

Files: packages/yambms/yambms_brand_registry.yaml, packages/yambms/yambms_canbus.yaml, packages/yambms/yambms_rs485.yaml

The protocol actually applied on a link is not readable from a single select. It is the result of a resolution with two inputs: the Protocol select, and — when that one is on Automatic — the Inverter brand select passed through the registry's mapping.

That resolution runs in a script, triggered at boot and on on_value of either select, and its result is stored in canbus${canbus_id}_active_protocol / rs485${rs485_id}_active_protocol. Everything else only reads that integer.

Do not inline the resolution back into the consumers. The 100 ms sequencing interval, the five protocol branches and the four LuxPower payload tweaks would each redo a table lookup and a series of std::string comparisons ten times a second, for a value that only changes when a user touches a select.

Do not dispatch on active_index() either. That is what the code did before: active_index() == 5 meant LuxPower purely by convention of the option order, so reordering the select silently broke four payload branches in different frames. The YB_PROTO_* constants are named, and the conversion from option string to constant exists in exactly one place — the resolution script.

on_value is used and not set_action: TemplateSelectWithSetAction::control() fires the set trigger before publish_state(), so a script called from set_action would read the previous option.

The resolution must not run during setup

on_value also fires when the select restores its value, at setup_priority::HARDWARE (800). The telemetry slot, on the other hand, is reserved in on_boot at priority: -100. Between the two, the vectors in yambms_core.yaml are still empty, so the script would index element 0 of an empty std::vector and the device would crash on every boot. The registry's std::function globals are at HARDWARE too, so calling them that early is a race of its own.

canbus${canbus_id}_link_ready / rs485${rs485_id}_link_ready is what closes both holes: the script returns immediately until the slot has been reserved, and the reservation raises the flag then runs the script explicitly. Do not drop that guard on the grounds that the has_state() check above it already protects the script — it does not, it only proves the selects have a value.

The YB_PROTO_* values are internal

They are never persisted, never published to Home Assistant and never sent to the telemetry service — the label from global_inverter_protocol_label() is what leaves the device. So the ranges can be renumbered or extended at any time with no impact on existing nodes.

The two invariants that do bind are elsewhere: the order of the select options, because restore_value stores an index (append new brands and protocols at the end, never insert), and the labels, because they carry the continuity of the collected telemetry.

File: packages/yambms/yambms_rs485_pylon.yaml

pylontech_rs485 is passive: it answers the inverter from the proxy sensors YamBMS feeds. Stopping the 100 ms interval therefore does not stop the link — the proxies keep their last value, update_state_from_sensors_() still returns true, and the component keeps answering with stale data while refreshing rs485_status, which is why the status stayed ON.

The component's own fail-safe is a NaN on any of the eight sensors it checks. The else branch of the interval publishes those NaN once per transition, guarded by rs485${rs485_id}_proxies_valid so it does not run ten times a second.

Only those eight sensors matter — the ones read by update_state_from_sensors_(). Invalidating the others would be harmless but pointless, and would hide which ones the contract actually depends on.

On RS485 the protocol is compiled, the brand only gates it

Files: packages/yambms/yambms_rs485.yaml, packages/yambms/yambms_rs485_pylon.yaml, packages/yambms/yambms_rs485_voltronic.yaml

rs485_protocol picks the implementation at compile time, and each implementation declares what it is in rs485${rs485_id}_compiled_protocol. In Automatic the resolution script applies that value and never derives a protocol from the brand: a node can only speak what was compiled into it, and resolving anything else made the diagnostics describe a protocol that was not running.

Voltronic and MPP Solar are the reason this cannot be a brand mapping. On recent firmwares, parameter 05 offers both PYL and LIB on RS485, so either implementation is a valid choice for the same inverter and the brand says nothing about which one was compiled.

LIB is the one exception. It is a Voltronic protocol and no other brand can use it, so in Automatic a node compiled for LIB stays silent for any other brand, and Note says why. Forcing LIB is still possible, because an explicit protocol always takes priority over the brand. Rebranded inverters are expected to select Voltronic. MPP Solar is not a rebrand, which is why it has its own entry.

File: packages/yambms/yambms_rs485_voltronic.yaml

modbus_server has no off switch, and returning nothing from a read_lambda only turns the reply into an exception frame, so the inverter still gets an answer on a link that should be silent. ModbusServerHub::find_device_() matches the address on every request, so moving the server to address 248 makes the hub drop the request instead. The 100 ms interval moves it back to 1 only while rs485${rs485_id}_active_protocol is LIB.

Do not replace this with reported charge and discharge limits of zero: the inverter would still see a battery, on a link the user believes is off.

File: packages/base/device_base_fault_registry.yaml

Turning a link off stops the frames, so the inverter stops acknowledging, the link timer expires and the status binary sensor goes false. Fed straight into global_update_fault() that lights the fault LED for something the user asked for.

The registry already had the right answer: state 2, which both the master mask and the health report ignore. global_update_fault() only takes a bool, so it can write 0 or 1 and nothing else — hence global_unregister_fault(), added alongside it.

Do not use Healthy for a disabled link. It would clear the LED just as well, but the health report would print [ OK ] for a link that sends nothing, which is worse than the bug it fixes.

The guard exists in two places and both are needed: the resolution script applies it when the protocol changes, and the status sensor's on_state applies it on every subsequent state change. Without the second one the link timer would re-raise the fault a few seconds later.

A link left at Automatic with no brand selected is deliberately not unregistered — it faults. That is the signal telling the user the node was never configured, which is the whole point of the 1.8.0 breaking change.

Both ACK triggers are registered

canbus.cpp matches a trigger on can_id and use_extended_id, so declaring 0x305 twice — once standard, once extended — is not a conflict: only the one matching the received frame fires. This is why the Schneider XW Pro extended ACK needs no configuration, and why the canbus_extended_ack substitution was removed. Both triggers call the same script so the handler is not duplicated.

Empirical constants

Some constants were found by trial on real hardware and must not be rounded or harmonised.